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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----~~~----~-~-------~-------~~----~--------------~----

IN RE THE MATTER
OF

CASE NUMBER

16853

NELDA BOYER

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATE~NT

OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant, Nelda Boyer, a 39 year old woman,
is said to be suffering from some degree of mental. retardation.

The State has imposed a guardian on her; the

guardian has the power to make the most fundamental kinds
~

of decisions affecting the liberty and property of Nelda
Boyer.

The guardian is granted these powers by Utah's

Guardianship Statute although the statute's defined standards are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The Second Judicial District Court of Weber
County, State of Utah found that:
a.

Appellant was an incapacitated person

as that term is defined in Rule 75-1-201 of
Utah Code Annotated.
b~

Appellant is in need of a guardian.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant asks that the trial court's
order declaring Nelda Boyer incapacitated and in need
of a guardian be set aside.
Appellant asks that Utah's Guardianship
Statute §75-1-201 be declared unconstitutional for the
reason that it is

overbroad and vague on its face or,

alternatively, that the trial court's finding be set
aside since Utah's Guardianship Statute §75-1-201 as
applied to Nelda Boyer is unconstitutionally overbroad
and vague in that it violates Nelda Boyer's due process
rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution
and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant is a 39 year old woman.

For

most of her life she lived with her father and elderly
mother in Reno, Nevada.

Five years ago her father, who

had been extremely ill, died.

Because of his illness,

appellant's father remained home and as testimony indicates,
both father and daughter had established a very close
relationship based on mutual care.

(Transcript, p. 7)

Soon after appellant's father died,
appellant's mother began visiting a family therapist in the
state of Nevada.

(Transcript, p. 60) · Mr. Wayne Abbott,
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the family therapist, analyzed the family relationship and
concluded that appellant was the cause of the family disruption

G

(Transcript, p. 58)

He therefore, recommended

that appellant be separated from the mother.
p. 58)

(Transcript,

He declared her incapacitated (Transcript, p. 52)

and in need of a guardian.

(Transcript, p. 57)

Mre

Abbott also recommended that Mre Kershaw's Jefferson
Manor located in Ogden, Utah, serve as appellant's new
home.

(Transcript, p. 58)
During the summer of 1979, appellant was

invited to Ogden, Utah, by her

relatives~

Testimony

confirms that the invitation to visit was extended for
the purpose of getting appellant into Utah in order to
facilitate confining appellant at Jefferson Manor and
having her declared "incapacitated" and in need of Mr.
Jerry Kershaw, as guardian.

(Transcript, p. 89)

On September 6, 1979, appellant contacted
Utah Legal Services.

In preparation for this action

appellant was referred to Doctor Richard T. Grow for a
psychological evaluation at the joint request of the
Division of Rehabilitation Services of Utah and Utah
Legal Services.

Dr. Grow is a psychologist and Chairman

of Weber State College Department of Psychology.
ten years experience ih this field.

He has

(Transcript, p. 178)

He concluded that appellant was mildly mentally retarded,
but did not recommend the imposition of a guardian.
(Transcript, p. 185)
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During the trial, Sharon Tanner, a friend
of the Court in this matter, recommended that a guardian
be appointed.

(Transcript, p. 82)

She elaborated that

Mr. Kershaw should not be appointed guardian, however,
since several state agencies were presently investigating
his nursing homes and many of them would not recommend him.
(Transcript, p. 95)

Mrs. Tanner also stated that her

findings, as presented to the Court, were based on Mr.
Abbott's report and on appellant's family testimony.
(Transcript, p. 90)

Mrs. Tanner admitted not knowing that

Mr. Abbott was not a psychologist although she presumed
that he was when she used his report.

(Transcript, p. 90)

Mrs. Tanner never made her own psychological evaluation of the
appellant nor had the Court given Mrs. Tanner any guidelines or procedures in-pursuing her evaluation of the
appellant for the Court.

(Transcript, p. 89)

Prior to the trial, Mrs. Tanner's report was
presented to the opposing attorney.

Based on Mrs. Tanner's

findings of Mr. Kershaw, this action's original Complaint
was amended so as to withdraw Mr. Kershaw as guardian and
substitute appellant's sister, Mrs. Susie Rice, as
guardian.

(Transcript, p. 109)
The testimony given at trial shows that

appellant was 35 years old before she was formally declared
mildly mentally retarded.

(Transcript, p. 108)

For the past

35 years appellant was presumed to be a "slow learner".
(Transcript, p. 108)

Evidence presented at the trial shows
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that Nelda Boyer can read (Transcript, p. 5) , write (Trans-

'-..L....L.J:-' '-,

}:'.

...I I

wu ..... i::'

,

(Transcript, p. 70) and cook (Transcript,

p. 213).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A DETERMINATION OF MENTAL
INCAPACITY UNDER THE UTAH
GUARDIANSHIP STATUTE RESULTS
IN A SEVERE DEPRIVATION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES.
In reviewing Utah's Guardianship Statute
§75-5-312, Nelda Boyer requests this Court to seriously
review the substantial deprivation that results from a
finding of mental incompetency.

It has been said that

no other judicial determination causes such a complete
loss of the basic rights of citizenshipe
Lewin'~

and T.

ment (1972)
Lewin).
keep

See G. Alexander

The Aged and the Need for Surrogate Manage-

(hereinafter referred to as 'Alexander and

In this review, Nelda Boyer asks that the Court

in mind a famous dissent of Justice Brandeis:
Experience should teach us to be most
on our guard to protect liberty when
the government's purpose _is beneficient
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
the insidious encroac:hment }?ymen of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.Se 438
479 (1928) Brandeis,J., dissenting.
A finding of mental incompetence and the im-

position of a general guardianship transfers that person's
basic civil rights to the guardian.

"The guardian
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assumes

respon~ibility

life of the ward."

for virtually every decision in the

J. Regan and G. Springer, "Protective

Services for the Elderly," A Working Paper

Prepared

for The Special Corrunittee on Aging, United States Senate
(July, 1977)

(hereinafter "Regan and Springer.").
An incompetent's loss of rights not only

includes those usually recognized by courts such as the
right to sue, make a contract, purchase and sell property,
marry or vote, but also may result in the loss of other
less obvious but equally fundamental rights.

Among

the recognized rights of citizenship which an adjudged
incompetent is denied are:

the right to go from place

to place as he/she pleases _Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)

; to meet with persons

in public places for social or political purposes .Coates
v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971)
of marriage and family life

; to privacy

Roe v. Wade, 460 U.S. 113

(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381

U~S.

479 (1965)

;

the right to choose a physician and to determine appropriate medical care
to be left alone

.Roe v. Wade, supra ; the right

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 507 (1969)

and the right to retain a favorable reputation
v. constautineau, 400·U.S. 433 (1971)

.

Wisconsin

As one prominent

commentator has recently remarked, "In a society which·
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venerates liberty, conservatorship is an anachronism."
G. Alexander, "Who Benefits from Conservatorship", 13
Trial 30, 32 (May, 1972).
Moreover, a limited discussion of the rights
deprived by the imposition of a guardianship would ignore
the profound psychological impact of a judicial decree
of incompetence.

The United States Court of Appeals

recognized this impact in Dale V. Hahn, 440 F2d. 633
(2nd Cir. 1971):
Although the plaintiff requests recovery
of money alleged to be illegally spent
by the (guardian), any right she may
have to the money is not the critical
interest sought to be protectede The
important ones are, rather, those
affected by the declaration that she
was incompetent to handle her own
affairs. The stigma of incompetency,
the implication that she has some
kind of mental deficiency, with
attendant untrustworthiness and
irresponsibility, and the consequences to her reputation and her
normal human relationships with others
in her community involve more than a
property right,
Id at 636.
Not only does a declaration of incompetency
result in giving a guardian the absolute right to determine a ward's physical environment, but, in many cases,
it is tantamount to orde.rin.g that t.he ward be. institutionalized.

Alexander and Lewin noted in their study of more

than 600 cases that there was a remarkably high correlation
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between finds of incompetency and subsequent institutionalization:
not only is a person found to be
incompetent bound to be deprived
of his right to manage his property, but is very likely to lose
his liberty in the process. Reported in Hearings on Legal f roblems
Affecting Older Americans Before
the Special Committee on Aging,
United States Senate, 9lst Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (1970).
This direct loss of freedom as a result of
guardianship determinations is confirmed by a study conducted in San Diego which concluded that despite an
attempt to keep persons in the community, legal intervention through incompetency proceedings caused higher
rates of institutionalization then otherwise would have
occurred.

Horowitz and Estes, "Protective Services for

the Aged",

(1971).
POINT II.
THE STATE'S INTEREST IN IMPOSING GUARDIANSHIP OVER
PERSONS DETERMINED TO BE
"INCAPACITATED" UNDER UTAH'S
STATUTORY SCHEME DOES NOT
OUTWEIGH THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS OF PRIVACY AND AUTONOMY.
The United States Supreme Court stated in

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1976), that the
right of privacy embraces a " ... general individual interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."

Nelda Boyer's privacy right to make

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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y

destroyed when guardianship was imposed upon hero

She

is no longer given the right to make any of the fundamental decisions concerning everyday lifee
of this

As a result

intrusion, she is denied one of the basic com-

ponents of "liberty" protected by the United States
Constitution
Amendment,

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

(Roe v. Wade, 410 UeS. 113, 152-53 (1973) and

the Due Process Clause of Utah's Constitution.
In cases where state

legisl~tion

has the

effect of intruding on personal privacy or autonomy, the
Supreme Court has balanced the state's interest allegedly
promoted by the statute and the personal privacy and
autonomy interests.

Griswold

Vo

Connecticut, 381 UeSo

479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

This in-

terest balancing approach requires that, in order for the
statute to stand, the weight of the state interest must
outweigh the fundamental privacy interest:
Where certain fundamental rights are
involved, the Court has held that a
regulation limiting these rights may
be justified only by a 'compelling
state interest' ... and the legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake ...
(Roe v. Wade at 155).
There is no legitimate, compelling state
interest which can outweigh appellant's personal privacy

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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right.

The legislative purpose is to protect those

persons who are "incapacitated" and who, according to
Utah Statute §75-1-201, "lacks sufficient understanding
or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions
concerning his person".

The paren patriae doctrine

espoused by the statutory scheme may at one time
been viable.

h~ve

In many situations, however, the imposition

of a protector over a person who the state determines to
be unable to succeed on his own, results in a deprivation
and a hindrance upon that person's potential and individuality.

With the

availa~ility

today of numerous

special programs for retarded individuals including:
special education programs, programs teaching self-care
skills, and the possibility of supervised living, the
limited state interest is far outweighted by the appellant's
privacy interest:
Individuals who are classified as
mentally retarded •.. constitute
approximately 89% of all persons
classified as retarded, and,
although limited in their potential
for academic achievement, can
utilize special education techniques to achieve self-sufficiency
as adults.
(Emphasis added)
The
Mentally Retarded Citizen's Civil
Rights at page 188.
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POINT III.
THE STATUTE PROVIDING FOR THE
IMPOSITION OF GUARDIANSHIP OVER
"INCAPACITATED PERSONS" DEPRIVES
THE PERSONS SO CLASSIFIED OR CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTSe
THIS
COURT SHOULD, THEREFORE, APPLY
STRICT SCRUTINY TO THIS STATUTORY
CLASSIFICATION AND REQUIRE THAT
THE STATE SHOW A COMPELLING STATE
INTEREST TO JUSTIFY THE STATUTEQ
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201 (18) defines
an "Incapacitated person" as "any person who is impaired
by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical
illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of
drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause (except
minority) to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible
decisions concerning his person 19
75-5~304

•

UoSoC. §§75=5-303 and

state the procedure for court appointment of a

guardian for an "incapacitated person".

Section 75-5-303

provides that, "(l) The incapacitated person or any person
interested in his welfare may petition for a finding of
incapacity and appointment of a guardian".

Section 75-5-304

states that, "The court may appoint a guardian as requested
if it is satisfied that the person for whom a guardian is
sought is incapacitated and that the appointment is neecessary or desirable as a means of providing continual
care and supervision of the person of the incapacitated
person".
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Nelda Boyer was found by the court to be an
"incapacitated person" because of mental deficiency.

She

was described at the hearing as being "mildly mentally
retarded".

(Transcript, p. 52). A retarded individual is

entitled to equal protection of the law (U.S. Const. Amend.
XIV, Sec. 1) and possesses certain fundamental rights, the sam1
fundamental rights possessed by all other citizens of the
United States.

In order for the state to infringe on these

rights, it must show a compelling state interest.

(Roe v.

Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. ,
~~

395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) .)

Even if the state is able to show a compelling

state interest, the "legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state.interests at
stake".

(Roe v. Wade, supra.)
A retarded person determined by the court to

be an incapacitated person under Utah's statutory scheme
loses all of his legal rights.

He loses the right to choose

where he shall live and where he shall travel; he loses the
power to consent to or refuse to submit to medical treatment
or other professional care and treatment; he loses all power
of control over his property and loses the right to enter a
contract.

(U.C.A. §75-5-312)

In essence, the person upon

whom guardianship is imposed loses the right to make any
decision concerning the fundamental rights to liberty and
property.
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There is no compelling state interest to
justify such a sweeping

classification of persons whose

rights are so broadly limited.
Various conceptions of the retarded
individual have been advanced to
justify denying the retarded citizen
the same rights, needs and desires
enjoyed by other memebers of the society
•.. The retarded individual may be seen
as an object of pity deserving of a
paternalistic environment which shelters
him against injury and risk and makes
few demands on his personal growth,
development, and responsibility. Fry,
The Mentally Retarded Citizen's Civil
Rights, 47 UMKC Law Review No. 2, at
189.
The parens patriae stance which the state has
assumed cannot possibly be characterized as promoting any
compelling state interest required to justify the pervasive
and dehumanizing effects of the statute.
POINT IV$
PERSONS SAID TO BE MENTALLY RETARDED
ARE DEPRIVED OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
WHEN GUARDIANSHIP IS IMPOSED ON THEM:
THE STATE HAS CREATED A SUSPECT
CLASSIFICATION WHEN IT MOVES TO
DEPRIVE SUCH PERSONS OF THEIR RIGHTS.
THEREFORE, THIS COURT SHOULD GIVE
SPECIAL SCRUTINY TO THIS STATE ACTION,
TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WHO
ARE HELPLESS AT LAW TO PREVENT THIS
ACTION FROM BEING TAKEN AGAINST THEM.
Persons said to be mentally retarded suffer
the loss of any or all legal rights, except those specifically protected by state law, from the time the state determines
them to be in need of a guardian.

In addition, such persons
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suffer the stigma of being labelled mentally retarded and
treated for any or all purposes from the perspective of
a society which presumes they are in need of help.
In this respect, persons said to be mentally
retarded are treated differently from anyone said to be
physically ill.

Except for some adults who are forced to

undergo blood transfusions contrary to their religious
beliefs, no state has a law requiring person over the age
of majority to be involuntarily hospitalized or treated to
protect his own welfare. See, Note, 48 Temple L. Quarterly,
354. 372 (Winter 1975).
A number of commentators have tried to express
what it means to individuals to be "culturally defined" as
mentally retarded and consequently treg.ted as such by society.'
See, e.g., Herr, Civil Rights, Uncivil Asylums, and the
Retarded, 43 U. Cin. L. Rev. 679, 681 (1974); E. Goffman,
Stigman:

Notes on the Management of Spoiled Indentity

(1963); S. Mercer, Labelling the Mentally Retarded (1972);
R. Hurley, Poverty and Mental Retardation:

A C-asua·l Re-

lationship (1969).
Mentally retarded persons, for example
have been cast into a number of destructive models which have justified rejection
and exclusion from the mainstream of
society (Wolfensberger, 1972). The following models are still relatively common
today:
1.

The subhuman organism ....
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2.

The menace ....

3.

The object of pity ....

4.

The eternal child .....

5.

The diseased organism •...

The implications of each of these models are
highly destructive--they virtually assure
that retarded persons will be effectively
isolated from community life and denied
access to IIJCU?.Y of those services which are
essential to function as an effective
human being. Roos, "Basic Facts About
Mental Retardation, "published in Vol . I
of the Legal Rights of the Mentally
Handicapped, at page 17, by the Practicing
Law Institute in 1974.
The myriad of rights that can be taken from persons labelled
as mentally retarded are documented and cited in Vol . II in
an article by W. Carnahan on "Rights to Love, Marry and
Bear Children, Hold Property, Have a Job and Go to Court,"
beginning at page 1015.
The total picture of the plight of mentally
retarded persons subjected to imposed guardianship was
painted this way in 1963 by the President's Commission on
Mental Retardation:
Most States' provisions for guardianship
of the retarded are relics of a time
when the mentally retarded individual
was considered an incompetent who had
to be kept away from normal social
contacts. They largely consider or
assume the retarded person to be without
rights, deny him due process or the
equal protection of the laws, and often
encumber his family's estate for years
at the price of the State's assuming
his care. The damage done to retarded
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individuals who are capable of selfsupport and self-reliance to those
who have become caught up in the judicial process, and to families who can
in effect be held responsible for a
retarded individual into a second
generation is incalculable. Stone,
"The Aging", in Mental Health and
Love: A System in T·ransition,
National Institute of Mental Health
P. 136 (1975).
Why don't more lawyers get involved
in mental retardation? Quite simply,
because there is no money in it .•..
It is time for all of us, lawyer and
layman alike, to realize that the
retarded person pays his horrible
price in legal, social and human
deprivation through no fault of his
own. Haggerty, et al., "An Essay on
Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded",
Family L. Quarterly 138, 149.
This dismal portrait of the mentally retarded
has caused at least one commentator, S. Herr, supra, to call
for the diagnosis to be treated as one creating a suspect
classification, at 690, and one court to draw the same
inference of a need for such a classification, to protect
this discrete and helpless minority from unwarranted governmental intrusion, In re G. H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974).
See the rationale behind such a classification, in United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n4.
(1938).

Certainly persons said to be mentally retarded

should benefit from a close judicial scrutiny as that accorded ;
to illegitimate persons or women.

New Jersey Welfare Rights
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Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 S. Ct. 1700 (1973);
Frontiero V. Richardson, 411 beS. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1964 (1973).
And something more than a rational basis must be offered by
these state defendants to justify the procedures and standards

adopted to subject persons said to be mentally retarded

to imposed guardianships.

THE UTAH GUARDIANSHIP STATUTE FAILS
TO LIMIT THE DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS
TO ONLY THOSE NECESSARY TO PROTECT
THE WARD.
Arguably the imposition of a guardian and
the taking of necessary protective measures is legitimate
when the state's compelling interest is to preserve the
health, life and well-being of its citizens.

Assuming this

to be true, a state may not adopt means to' this end which
involve a deprivation of rights and liberties more extensive
than necessary to protect the individual.

The Utah Guardian-

ship Statute unconstitutionally violates this principal.
There are persons who are totally unable
to make or convey decisions about their lives (a comatose
individual is an obvious example).

There are also many

retarded persons who are in fact fully capable of providing
for their own needs:
Approximately 89% of retarded
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individuals are mildly mentally
retarded, 6% are moderately retarded, and only 5% are severly
and profoundly retarded. It is
generally accepted that the mildly
retarded are capable of economic
self-sufficiency, and the moderately retarded can be economically productive in sheltered employment. Roos, Basic Facts
About Mental Retardation, in
Legal Rights of the Mentally
Handicapped, (PLI 1974), ·at p. 19.
Between the above extremes lies a number of
mentally retarded persons who are capable of managing some,
but not all, of their personal or financial affairs.

Such

capabilities are easily evidenced in the particular in
Nelda Boyer's case.
The transcript shows that Nelda Boyer:
1.

Went to school through eighth grade
ttranscript, p. 5) ;

2.

Is a bargain hunter

3.

Can make decisions

4.

Can take care of her hypoglicemia.
p. 8 6.) ;

5.

Can shop

6.

Can make change

7.

Can formulate plans

8.

Can follow instructions

9.

Can cook

ttranscript, p. 105);
(Transcript, p. 55

&

82);

(Transcripi

(Transcript, p. 70);
(Transcript, p. 75);
(Transcript, p.71);
(Transcript, p. 219) l

(Transcript, p. 213);

10.

can prepare shopping a list (Transcript, p. 214

11.

Has proper hygiene

(Transcript, p. 211);
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13.

Has dressing skills

14 ..

Has house skills

15.

Can read

16.

Can write

(Transcript, p. 211) ;
(Transcript, p. 211) ;

(Transcript, p .. 5)

i

and

(Transcript, p .. 5) •

Appointment of a general guardian for a
mentally retarded person who is partially competent arguably runs afoul of the federal constitutional principle of
"less drastic means" ..

Sheldon v .. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,

488 (1960) ..
The doctrine of the "least restrictive
alternative" is forcefully presented in Sheldon vQ Tucker,
where an Arkansas statute required teachers to disclose
all organizations in which they held membership during
the previous five years.

In striking down this statute,

the Supreme Court held that although the state had a
legitimate concern in these matters:
"that purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle
personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved ..
The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light
of less drastic means of achieving
the same basic purpose.n Id at 488.
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Such a restricted means was to limit inquiry into membership that had been taken in any one of a list of subversive organizations.

This principle

applies when govern-

mental action infringes upon a person's fundamental,
constitutional rights.

Where a compelling state interest

is found for an infringement of a person's fundamental
constitutional rights, this principle requires that the
State's infringement occur in the least drastic
consistent with its purpose.

manner

Arguably, the appointment

of a plenary guardian for a person who is partially competent does not satisfy the constitutional principle of
"less drastic means" because a State could provide a more
limited form of guardianship for that person.
For example in the case of- Lake v. Cameron,
364 F 2d. 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the doctrine of "least
restrictive alternative" was applied to the civil-conunitment field.

In that case, an elderly woman was found wander-

ing the streets by a policeman and taken to the District of
Columbia Hospital.

There diagnosed as suffering from

"chronic brain syndrome"; Mrs. Lake "demonstrated very
frequent difficulty with her memory".

Id at 658.
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At the commitment hearing, two psychiatrists
testified that Mrs. Lake was, because of her condition,
mentally ill and although she was not dangerous to others
and would not intentionally harm herself, was subject
to "wandering

away and being out exposed at night or any

time she is out."

Id at 657-658.

The Court held that

Mrs. Lake was not a proper subject for indeterminate
commitment without full exploration of all other possible
alternatives available for her care and treatment in the
community including "an identification card on her person
so that the police or others could take her home if she
should wander ... "
said:

Id at 661.

In conclusion, the Court

"Deprivations of liberty solely because of dangers

to the ill persons themselves should not go beyond what
is necessary for their protection." Id at 660.
Under the doctrine of the least restrictive
alternative it becomes incumbent upon the state to fully
explore all other measures to protect the individual&
Guardianship proceedings do not exist in a vacuum.

There

are available many other social and legal devices that may
be called into play to assist an individual of diminished
capacity~

Legally less restrictive alternatives include,

inter alia, agency relationships, of a general, limited or
durable nature, forms of joint property such as joint bank
accounts, and the Social Security Representative Payee
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system.

All these allow less restrictive means of handling

property, paying bills, etc.
In addition to these legal alternatives, social
service support systems designed to assist individuals with
limited impairments should be considered by the Court.

These

services include, inter alia, out-patient medical centers,
home health aids, home help services (cleaning, cooking,
assistance with personal care), geriatric day care, visiting
nurses, transportation services, ch?re services and nutrition
services all of 'Which .can be used as alternatives to the appointment of
a guardian and, if appointment is necessary, as supplemental
services for the ward.
Mr. Gerald A. Miller, State Executive Director
of the Utah Association for Retarded Citizens, made this
clear during the trial when he described a variety of programs that do exist in Utah:
There are a number of programs in Utah
that affect the lives of all retarded
from birth right up through death. The
nurses at the Department of Health
operate an early infant stimulation.
Our public schools are charged by
federal law to educate in the State
of Utah from 5 to 21 years of age
mentally retarded people. And we also
have shelter workshops and work activity
centers for retarded, in addition to the
Department of Vocational Rehab services
that offer services to the retarded. Utah
also provides services through the State
Department of Education, via the Vocational Rehabilitation Services, which
licenses work activity in shelter workshop
agencies across the State.
(Transcript, p. 205) ~
The attractiveness of the doctrine of least
restrictive alternative is that it requires inquiry into how
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the individual's "best interest" can be served while
minimizing abridgment of fundamental liberties.

In this

respect, least restrictive alternative comports with the
principal that due process is a "flexible doctrine and
calls for such procedures as the particular situation
demands".
367

U.S~

Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,
886, 895 (196l)o
POINT VIo
NELDA BOYER'S RIGHTS TO BE PROVED
INCAPACITATED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE IS BEING DENIED.
Despite the large number of guardianships

imposed each year, appeals of incompetency determinations
are rareo

For example, a field study of 600 guardianship

cases in New York did not uncover a single appeal of the
trial court's

~indingso

Ge Alexander & T. Lewin, at 29e

This phenomenon is partially due to the fact that it is
unlikely that a finding of incompetency will be overturned
on appeal since state courts are most reluctant to set aside
determinations of the trial court based on a de novo review
of the evidence.

Moreover, the standard of proof at a guardian=

ship hearing is typically low, requiring only "clear and
convincing" evidence.

In Re Guardianship of Mills, 350

Wis. 401, 27 N.W.2d 375 (1947), or some lesser quality
and quantity of evidence such as mandated in Nelda Boyer's
case which established that the necessity of appointing a
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guardian rests wi.th the petitioner who only had to establish
this need by a preponderance of the evidence.

(Transcript, p.22

In practice, the trial court's decision will be affirmed
on appeal if there is any evidence in the record to support
it.

This attitude is reflected in Re Guardianship of

·Walters, 37 Ca. 2d. 239, 245 (1951), enunciating the "substantial evidence" rule:
All conflicts and any reasonable
doubt as to the sufficiency of the
evidence must be resolved in favor of
the order •... In cases of this type,
as in any other, we must uphold the
findings of the trial court if there
is any substantial evidence which,
together with the aid of all inferences to be drawn from it, tends
to support the judgment.
Because of threat of involuntary confinement, the loss of
civil rights, the stigma of incompetency and the indeterminate nature of the adjudication, the Utah standard of
proof is constitutionally inadequate.
The United States Supreme Court held that proof
by a preponderance of the evidence is insufficient in juvenile
delinquency proceedings, saying that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is required because it "is a prime instrument for
reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error."
In Re Winship, 397, U.S .. 358, 363 (1970).

The higher

standard of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, will
not serve to preclude necessary guardianship actions; rather,
it will serve to encourage caution in fact finding under
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I

'
,I

an incompetency proceeding.

Moreover, it will reduce the

likelihood of factual error, the imposition of unnecessary
guardianships and the attendant deprivation of rights and
liberties ..
In the civil commitment area, Lessard v ..
Schmidt, 349 F., Supp .. 1078, vacated and remanded for a more
specific injunctive order, 945 S .. Ct .. 713 (1974), amended
opinion, required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, stating;
The argument for a more stringent
standard of proof is more compelling
in the case of a civil commitment
in which an individual will be deprived of basic civil rights and be
certainly stigmatized by the lack of
confidentiality of the adjudication ..
Id at 1095 ..
Supporting the necessity for a higher standard of proof,
In Re B~llay, 482 F 2d.

(D .. C., Cir .. 1973), drew a distinction

between commitment proceedings and other civil cases:
Where the stakes are frequently
economic and where 'we view it as
no more serious in general for
there to be an erroneous verdict in
the plaintiffs favor .. '
Id at 663,
quoting In Re Winship, 397 U .. S ..
358, 391 (1970)
Clearly the analogous situation prevails in incompetency
proceedings where erroneous imposition of a guardianship can
be so damaging to the affected individual.
For these reasons, the Utah Guardianship
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Statute should be held unconstitutional for failing to
ensure that the proposed ward's conduct meets the statutory
test of incompetency by clear and convincing proof.
POINT VII •.
ACCEPTANCE OF EXPERT WITNESS'
TESTIMONY IS WITHIN PROVINCE OF
THE TRIER OR FACTS: HOWEVER, IT
IS INCUMBANT UPON THE TRIAL JUDGE
TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRELIMINARY
FACTS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED, UPON
WHICH THE EXPERT MADE HIS OPINION.
The general precedent is that the trial court
is allowed considerable latitude of

discretion in adrnissi-

bility of expert testimony, and in the absence of a clear
showing of abuse, the reviewing court will not reverse.
~ "'1

Mal~uay

v. Cox Const. Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979);

Rodriguez v. McDonald Douglas Corp., 399

Ca. Rptr. 151

(Cal. App. (1978); Fillmore City, v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316
(Utah 1977); State By and Through Road Commission v. Silliman
439 P.2d 279 (Utah 1968); Marsh v. Irvine, 449 P.2d 602 (Utah:
1969h Lamb v. Bangant, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974); Re Hanson,

87 Utah 580, 52 P.2d 1103 (1935); Re Christiansen, 17 Utah
412, 53 P. 1003 (1898).
In the case of Dobbs v. State 191 Ark. 236, 85
S.W.2d 694 (1935), the court defines the criteria used
to qualify witnesses as expert in the field of mental
incompetency.

The court oulined.the following three
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I

· criteria:
1)
as a general rule such witness
should have a general knowledge of
medicine as a practicing physician,
a general knowledge of the mind and
its functions and of mental phenomena
and the disorders which attack the
mind, although in some jurisdictions
exceptions have been made permitting
witnesses to testify as experts who
did not possess all these qualifications of the insane;
2)
where the claimed mental derrangement is of a common type, any regular physician in good standing, doing
general practice, and who has studied
the diseases of the mind along with
other diseases of the body can testify
as an expert, the extent of his
learning going alone to his credibility;
3)
where the claimed insanity is not
of the commoner type, but is of a rare,
unusual, or complex nature, then the
witness called as an expert should
qualify by showing a reasonable amount
of experience in the study and investigation or observation of the kind or
class of insanity under investigatione
A general statement in case law regarding the
qualifications of an expert witness can be found in Bratt
v. Western Air Lines, IncG, 155 FG2d 850 (10th Cire 1946),
wherein the court stated:

"A witness is an expert witness

and is qualified to give expert testimony if the judge finds
that to perceive, know or understand the matter concerning which
witness is to testify, requires special knowledge, skill, experience
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or training and that the witness has the requisite special
knowledge, skill, experience or training. "

The. court further

asserts that "whether a witness called to·testify to any
matter of opinion -has s.uch qualifications and knowledge as
to make his testimony admissible, is a preliminary question
for the judge presiding at the trial, and his decision of
it is conclusive, unless clearly shown to be erroneous as
a matter of law.
According to 40 A.L.R. 2d. §§63, 64, the
situation where the mental condition of one sought to be
put under or relieved of guardian is involved, the following
factual bases are pertinent when the witness testifies to
insanity or incompetency.
two categories:

The bases are divided into

sufficient and insufficient.

Nonexpert opinion evidence as to the incompetency of one involved in guardianship proceedings·was held
to have been founded upon a sufficient predicate of opportunity of observation and acquaintanceship where:
the witness had known the person in question
intimately for sixteen or more years.
The sufficiency of this basis involves
the witness's opportunity to observe the
alleged incompetent.
the witness had cared for the alleged
incompetent.
the witness had seen a great change in
the incompetent.
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Nonexpert opinion was held to be insufficient
wherein:
the witnes.s. had known the person in
question several years, but had
merely met him in passing. Re
C'armichael (1860) 36 Ala . 51~
the witness had known the person
in question for sixteen years,
but had never conversed with him.
no statement of fact or recitation
of conduct on the part of one for
whom a guardian was sought to be
appointed presented an unnatural
or unusual situation, all the facts
alleged being entirely consistent
with the defendants' manner of life,
his habits, his prejudices, and his
conduct during the years when his
mental capacity was not questionedc
Caltriden v .. Sharon (1914) Iowa 287,
145 N.W., 540 ..

The credibility of the expert witness is
described in the Fillmore case, suprae, as being a person
with specialized knowledge in the field to the extent that
his testimony.can be helpful to the jury on matters with
which they personally are not familiar.

His testimony may

be received as an expert but whether he is so qualified
rests within the sound discretion of the trial courtc

The

Mal tu}?y case, supra. , further describes the expert as someone
whose knowledge may be acquired through experience as well
as through formal education and studyc
However, the Re Hanson holds that the
opinion of a witness

as to the mental condition of a testator
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cannot be given unless the witness gives details of the
underlying facts upon which the opinion is based.
In the more recent case of State By and
Through Road Commission,

supra.,

the opinion in Re Hanson

is upheld and further articulated when the court says,
the qualification of an expert
witness is to be determined by
the trial judge, and if he determines that the witness by reason
of training and experience can
assist the jury by giving an opinion
on a matter properly before the
court, the Supreme Court, on appeal,
should not hold that the testimony
should be stricken unless such palpable ignorance of the subject matter
is manifested by the witness as to
indicate an abuse of .discretion on
the part of the trial judge in allowing the witness to express an opinion
in the first place or in refusing to
grant a motion to strike after i t is
given.
The Rodriguez case, supra.,

reiterates the

issue of the trial judges duties by declaring,
acceptance or rejection of expert
witnesses is within the province
of the trier of fact; however, i t
is incumbant upon the trial judge
to determine whether the preliminary
facts have been established, including the foundation material upon which
the expert made his assumptions.
Ignorance of the subject matter and lack of
determination of the preliminary facts upon which the experts
found Nelda Boyer incapacitated abound in this trial:
During the trial and over counsel's objection
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(Transcript, p.50 & 52), Mr. Wayne Abbott was permitted to
conclude that in his opinion:
1.

Nelda Boyer could not hold a job
(Transcript, Pc 53);

2.

Nelda Boyer is mentally deficient
(Transcript, p. 52) ; and

3.

Nelda Boyer is in need of a
(Transcript, p. 53)

guardian~

Nelda Boyer's counter-evidence serves to
show that Mr. Abbott admits not being a psychologist, a
medical doctor, nor a psychiatrist.

(Transcript, po 59).

Mr. Abbott also admits nqt testing Nelda Boyer in the
manner a psychologist would have (Transcript, Pc 60) but
states that his method is the same as used by psychiatrists
(Transcript, Pe 66) even through he is not trained in said
field (Transcript, p. 59).

Mr. Abbott

agrees with Doctor

Grow's evaluation of Nelda Boyer (Transcript, p.58) even
though Mr. Abbott never gave Nelda Boyer any of the tests
used by Doctor Grow to evaluate Nelda Boyero
included:

These tests

Human Figure Drawing, Wechsler Adult Intelligence,

Gray's Oral Reading Paragraphs, Bender Gestalt, Graham
Campbell Memory For Designs, Sentence Completion, the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Victorian
and Rorschach Test.

(Transcript, p. 180)

Mr. Abbott also

admits never visiting Nelda Boyer while Nelda Boyer worked
at the MGM Hotel in Reno, Nevada.

(Transcript, po64)

Finally, Doctor Grow, the Chairman of the Department of
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Psychology at Weber State College, who has ten years of
clinical experience· and who has helped

set up mental

health programs within the State of Utah (Transcript, p. 178:
concludes that if he had to choose between imposing a
guardian on Nelda Boyer or grant her total independence,
he, as a psychologist, would recommend to give Nelda Boyer
her freedom.

(Transcript, p. 185)
Testimony given during the trial shows

that Sharon Tanner, a social worker used by the Court,
used Mr. Abbott's report to supplement her own report
(Transcript, p. 90), but that she would have changed her
report had she known Mr. Abbott was not a psychologist.
(Transcript, p. 90)

Mrs. Tanner also admits not having

tested Nelda Boyer (Transcript, p. 89).

Nelda Boyer's

mother admits not knowing Mr. Abbott's credentials
(Transcript, p._23).

Her sister admits that Nelda Boyer's

deficiencies are a product of no training (Transcript, p. 1091
Testimony also shows that Nelda Boyer was living with
her mother a person who is sensitive (Transcript, p. 107}
and was close to a nervous breakdown (Transcript, p. 48).
POINT VIII.
THE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING
WHETHER A PERSON IS "INCAPACITATED" AS DEFINED IN 75-1-201
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD AND
VAGUE.
For the purposes of the imposition of a
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guardian over an "incapacitated person", §75-1-201 Utah
Code Annotated defines an "incapacitated person" as " ....
any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness,
mental deficiency, physical illness or disability,
advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication,
or other cause (except minority) to the extenb that he
lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate responsible decisions concerning his person."
The appellant was found to fall within this definition
because of a "mental deficiency", or mild mental retardation.,

(Transcript, p. 52)
The indentification and treatment
of the mentally retarded is, to a
large extent, culturally definedo
Those individuals who exhibit
"significantly subaverage general
intellectual functions, existing
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during
the development period", are labeled
retarded and are treated accordingly~
Exactly what constitute subaverage
intellectual functioning, however,
depends on relative concepts designed
to fulfill the social need or desire
to classify individuals who are
considered inadequate or unable to
perform so-called normal tasks~
"Retarded Citizens' Civil Rights",
UMKC Law Review, Vol 47, No. 2, at
page 187.
The difficulty lies in the fact that the

statute's terms are so amorphous and value-laden that their
application to any particular fact situation is left to
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the discretion of the decision-maker.

Individuals whose

competency is questioned find themselves having to defend
any and every aspect of their personal lives since all is
made relevant by the statute.
The labels of "mentally retarded" or
"mentally deficient" are vague and completely lacking
of any satisfactory definition.

The only criteria that

the statute supplies is whether the person "lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate
responsible decisions concerning his person".

The

Editorial Board Comment to §75-5-304 Utah Code Annotated
discusses the term "incapacitated" as applied to the
guardianship statute.

It merely states

~hat,

"It is

assumed that the standards suggested by the definition
in §75-1-201 (18) for the 'incapacitated' person are
different from those which will determine when a person
may be committed as

ment~lly

ill".

The comment goes on

to discuss where there might be an overlap between the
two standards.

It does not shed any light on the meaning

of the language used to set up the standard for determining
"incapacitated".
In the criminal law context, courts frequently
find statutes unconstitutionally vague both because their
terms do not set forth precisely the conduct proscribed
and because vague statutes provide no ascertainable guidelines to the decision-maker, thus inviting arbitrary
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applications of the law.

Grayned v. City of Rockford,

408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972).

Implicit in those decisions is the recognition that a vague standard is no standard at all.

Not

only the judge but the individual whose liberty interests
are at stake must .guess at the meaning of the lawc

As

a result, his or her ability to prepare a meaningful
defense is severely hampered or obliterated.

One major

function of the Constitution's guarantee of due process
is the elimination of these practical obstacles, yet incompetency proceedings universally place alleged incompetents
in such an unfair position.
The use

of imprecise language in the statute

leads to the creation of a group of persons who suffer the
consequences of the statutory definition needlessly.

The

United States Supreme Court has stated that where a state
enacts legislation affecting "fundamental rights", the
legislation, ".e.must be narrowly drawn to express only
the legitimate state interests at stake".
(Supra).

Roe v. Wade,

Certainly the state interest in providing "·•o

for the care of a person who is unable to care for himself",

(Editorial Board Comment to §75-5-304 U.C.A.) is

not served by the use of a statute with such imprecise
terminology that its application results in bringing persons within its scope who were not intended by the legislature to be so placed.
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The fact that appellant was afforded a
hearing was represented by counsel and was assured
procedural safeguards does not prevent the statute from
being overbroad and vague.

Nor can " •.. even strict

construction of a statute ..• save it from a declaration·
of unconstitutional if the language is so overbroad and
vague, as to impose deprivation of rights from persons
who should not have to forfeit them".

Bell v. Wayne

County General Hospital, 384 F. Supp. 1085 (1974).
The statute provides that a person is
"incapacitated" "to the extent that he lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person".

(Emphasi·s added)

The statute does not establish the criteria for determining
what is a "responsible decision concerning his person".
In the vast array of decisions that a person makes daily
concerning his person, it is a purely arbitrary classification as to which are "responsible" decisions and which
are not.

Surely this clearly subjective, cultural standard

cannot serve as a basis for stripping a person of his
constitutionally-protected ·rights.
CONCLUSION
Nelda Boyer is now threatened with the
severe curtailment of constitutionally protected
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rights and liberties.

The fundamental rights endangered

include the right to contract and hold property, the
right to live free of constraint, and the right to life
itself

c

The state under its parens patriae power

threatens abridgement of these rights under its guardianship statute because Nelda Boyer is alleged to be
mentally incapacitatede
Moreover, as a result of this adjudication,
persons of diminished functional abilities are subjected
to plenary guardianships, even though a lesser deprivation
could be adequate to protect the warde

Permitting this,

the Utah Statute endangers Nelda Boyer and other wards
with the unnecessary loss of fundamental rights and
liberties, including the right to decide her place of
residence ..
Due process of law will not permit such
treatment of our citizens.

The charade that the Utah

Guardianship Statute is justified by the "best interest"
doctrine cannot continue.

Rather, instead of negating

the individual and his capacity of self-autonomy,

state

law would do better to concentrate on treating the proposed ward as a whole person, capable of guiding his own
destiny and making his own life choices, until the contrary is proven by clear and convincing evidence.
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Nelda Boyer requests this Court to find the
Utah Guardianship Statute unconstitutional and to enjoin
its enforcement against her in the specifics described.

DATED this \ \

day of March, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,
SERVICES, INC.

·~A~
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